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ABSTRACT 
 
Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA 1990) created the first large 
scale cap-and-trade program as a means to control acid rain in the United States.  The program 
regulated the emission of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrous oxide (NOx) in the atmosphere—the 
precursor to acid rain. Economists have long argued for the use of market-based incentive 
approaches as oppose to traditional command-and-control methods for its ability to be efficient 
and cost-effective.  Title IV went into full effect in 1995 and has been lauded among one of the 
most successful regulation as it was efficient in reducing SO2 at lower cost than other program.   
Market based or incentive based programs work by providing incentives for individuals 
and firms to alter polluting behavirors by inposing opportunity cost through pricing.  The altering 
of polluting bvehaviors is achieved by changes in the regulatory environment in which firms 
operate.  However, when prices are low there is the potential for the loss of incentive.  
Such loss in the regulatory environment occurred in 2008 when the D.C. Circuit 
overturned the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) and remanded the dispute to EPA to develop 
new rules for its replacement.  This thesis found regulatory uncertainty to contribute significantly 
to the decline in the price of emission permits.  However, the contribution is relatively small.  
The adoption of technology appears to be the driving factor behind the decline in the price of 
emission permits.  In the context of the Clean Air Act, there was the expectation of more 
stringent SO2 standards and regulation of mercury emissions.  Scrubber technology used to 
control the emission of SO2 has also shown to be effective in limiting the emissions of oxidized 
mercury.  Since the announcement of these standards there has been a statistically significant 
increase in the number of control technologies being implemented.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA 1990) was designed to deal 
with the issue of acid rain (formerly acid deposition) reduction.  The program regulated the 
emission of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrous oxide (NOx) into the atmosphere—the precursor to 
acid rain.  The regulation applied to electricity generating utility plants located in the contiguous 
United States.  As a method of control, the United State Congress broke from the traditional 
command-and-control methodologies in pollution regulation and created the first large scale 
market for tradable emission permits—a market/incentive based method.   
Economists have long argued for the use of market-based incentive approaches (i.e.  
market for tradable permits), as oppose to traditional command-and-control methods for its 
ability to be efficient and cost-effective (Hahn & Stavins, 1992).  Title IV (The Acid Rain 
Program) was fully implemented in 1995 and has been lauded among one of the most successful 
regulation as it was effective in reducing SO2 concentration at a lower cost than other program.  
According to Swift (2005) the strong regulatory framework coupled with cap and trade “is one of 
the most effective ways to reduce pollution.”  The program has seen near perfect compliance and 
has banked significant amount of (unused) permits for future use.   
Building upon the successes of the Acid Rain Program, in 2005 the EPA issued the Clean 
Air Interstate Rule (CAIR).  CAIR is a product of the EPA’s rulemaking procedure.  It was 
designed to further reduce SO2 and NOX emissions in order to meet the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for criteria pollutant a mandate by the Clean Air Act.   CAIR 
required emission for SO2 and NOX to be reduced by 57% and 61%, respectively of 2003 levels 
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to be achieved by 2015 (Sotkiewicz & Holt, 2005).  CAIR is tied into the Acid Rain Program by 
the use of emission permits, where permits allocated under Title IV may be used to comply with 
the emission reductions mandated by CAIR.     
In 2008 several states and utility companies petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals D.C. 
Circuit for judicial review of CAIR.  The court ruled there were “more than several fatal flaws” 
with the rule, and the EPA had overstepped the statutory authority granted by the Clean Air Act 
(Kruse, 2009).  The D.C. Circuit vacated the rule and remanded the dispute to EPA to develop a 
replacement rule that is consistent with the court’s decision.   
 Market based or incentive based regulations rely on changes in the regulatory framework 
in order to be effective, thus the overruling of CAIR has left a regulatory void.  As a result, the 
industry faces uncertainty as to decisions for capital investments into control technologies for 
future compliance; and the individual states face uncertainty about strategies for compliance with 
NAAQS criteria (Moren, 2009).   Regulatory uncertainty is suspected to be the cause of failures 
in the market for SO2 permits.  Woodward (2010) has shown the price and volume of SO2 
emission permits on a steady decline since the overturning of the rule.   
Figure 1-1 shows the price of permits along with events and proposed actions by the EPA 
which results in changes in the price for SO2 emission permits.   The figure demonstrates an 
increase in the price following the announcement of tighter standards for particulate matter of 
size 2.5 microns (PM 2.5).  This is followed by a downward trend during the period when CAIR 
was argued to when courts made its ruling.  
 
 
3 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
5
/2
5
/2
0
0
6
7
/2
5
/2
0
0
6
9
/2
5
/2
0
0
6
1
1
/2
5
/2
0
0
6
1
/2
5
/2
0
0
7
3
/2
5
/2
0
0
7
5
/2
5
/2
0
0
7
7
/2
5
/2
0
0
7
9
/2
5
/2
0
0
7
1
1
/2
5
/2
0
0
7
1
/2
5
/2
0
0
8
3
/2
5
/2
0
0
8
5
/2
5
/2
0
0
8
7
/2
5
/2
0
0
8
9
/2
5
/2
0
0
8
1
1
/2
5
/2
0
0
8
1
/2
5
/2
0
0
9
3
/2
5
/2
0
0
9
5
/2
5
/2
0
0
9
7
/2
5
/2
0
0
9
9
/2
5
/2
0
0
9
1
1
/2
5
/2
0
0
9
1
/2
5
/2
0
1
0
3
/2
5
/2
0
1
0
5
/2
5
/2
0
1
0
7
/2
5
/2
0
1
0
9
/2
5
/2
0
1
0
1
1
/2
5
/2
0
1
0
1
/2
5
/2
0
1
1
3
/2
5
/2
0
1
1
5
/2
5
/2
0
1
1
7
/2
5
/2
0
1
1
9
/2
5
/2
0
1
1
1
1
/2
5
/2
0
1
1
Mar. 27, 2007: 
EPA Finalized 
PM 2.5 Rule
Mar. 25, 2008: 
CAIR Argued
Jul. 11, 2008: 
CAIR decided—
Vacture and 
remand
Sept. 24, 2008: 
EPA Petitioned 
the Court’s 
ruling
Dec. 23, 
2008: Temp. 
stay on CAIR 
and Remand
Jan. 1, 2009: 
CAIR Phase I 
NOx Begins
Jan. 1, 2009: 
CAIR Phase I 
SO2 Begins
 
Figure 1-1: Price for Sulfur Dioxide Emission Permits
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Also demonstrated in figure 1-1 is the decline in prices after the court’s final ruling on 
CAIR in 2008.  Permit prices showed a sharp decline then continued the downward trend.  
Palmer and Evans (2010) reported spot prices fell from $300 to $80 per permit, when the Circuit 
court vacated CAIR.  Upon temporary reinstatement of CAIR prices rose from $140 to $210 per 
permit.  This is then followed by a steady decline in prices where permits were traded as low as 
$3.88 at the end of 2010.   
The overruling of CAIR created a regulatory void that is cause for concern. Moren (2009) 
states “The D.C. Circuit’s ruling has left a worrisome regulatory gap: downwind states are still 
enduring the human health and environmental impacts from the upwind pollution, and industry, 
faced with regulatory uncertainty, is unable to effectively plan for the future.”  Kruse (2009) 
commented the decision “bears heavily on future attempts to efficiently deal with pollution.”  
The D.C. Circuit’s decision combined with the observed market reaction raises the question: 
what is the effect of regulatory uncertainty on tradable emission permits?   
 
1.2 Rationale for the Study 
Title IV of the CAAA of 1990 has been efficient in reducing the overall level of SO2 in 
the atmosphere, and achieved such reductions relatively cost-effectively.  As a result, the 
program has served as a model to control carbon dioxide emission reduction envisioned in the 
Kyoto Protocol, and European Union Trading Scheme.  The objective of the study is to assess 
the role of regulations with respect to market based incentive policy instrument.  This thesis is 
focused on explaining the dramatic decline in SO2 permit prices (demonstrated in figure 1-1).  It 
is hypothesized that the decline in prices are due to regulatory uncertainty due to the overruling 
of the Clean Air Interstate Rule. 
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 Through the use of statistical and econometric models, regulatory uncertainty is analyzed 
through an examination of the price of SO2 permits in the context of the electricity production.  
On the qualitative side, is an examination of the timeline of events, proposed rules and regulatory 
actions for the Acid Rain Program and CAIR.  Because market-based incentive program rely on 
changes in the regulation which engender a desired behavioral change, a timeline of events 
provide a context for the analysis. 
 To understand and analyze the effects of regulatory uncertainty, this analysis is organized 
by first looking at the theoretical framework of tradable emission permits, then a historic look at 
air pollution regulations in the United States, followed by description of the Acid Rain Program.  
I then describe the data and model used followed by the interpretation and discussion of the 
results.    
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CHAPTER 2:  BACKGROUND/LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Sulfur dioxide 
 
Sulfur dioxide (SO2) is a naturally occurring atmospheric gas; it is formed from the 
oxidation of elemental sulfur (S).  Sulfur dioxide enters the atmosphere through natural and 
anthropogenic sources.  Natural source include the eruption of volcanos, decomposition and 
combustion of organic matter (Kellog, Candle, Allen, Lazrus, & Martell, 1972).  Anthropogenic 
source is primarily from the combustion of fossil fuel.  In the United States, the largest 
anthropogenic source of SO2 is from the emission originates from electricity generating power 
plants (73%) and other industrial facilities (20%) (EPA, 2011).  Figure 1-1 below obtained from 
the EPA shows the total contribution of anthropogenic emissions of SO2.   
 
Figure 2 -1: Anthropogenic Sources of Sulfur Dioxide 
From point sources, SO2 is emitted along with other gasses in plumes which mostly 
remain in the well-mixed layer of the atmosphere.  The gas becomes mixed and dispersed 
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horizontally and vertically due to weather and the prevailing wind (Mason, 1992).  In the 
atmosphere, SO2 becomes oxidized where it is converted to sulfuric acid (H2SO4).  Figure 1-2 
shows the conversion process from SO2 gas emitted from point sources to the formation of 
sulfuric acid in the atmosphere and final deposition.   
 
Figure 2-2:  Conversion Process of Sulfur Dioxide 
The converted sulfuric acid can then exist in “dry” form (gaseous or particulate matter) or “wet” 
when combined cloud and raindrops.  Sulfuric acid is then returned to the Earth’s surface.  Dry 
form can be absorbed by vegetation, and wet is returned in rain, snow or fog (Mason, 1992) 
(EPA, 2011).    
 The effects of sulfur dioxide on the environment and human health and are well 
documented.  Sulfuric acid deposited on the Earth’s surface lead to the acidification of 
freshwater lakes and streams.  In soil, it mobilizes naturally occurring metals such as lead, 
cadmium, mercury and aluminum, which are toxic to humans.  In their elemental form these 
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metals are not biologically available, however their solubility increase with decreasing pH.  
Though acidic deposition is not solely responsible for mobilizing these metals, it increases the 
uptake rate (Maugh, 1984).   
 Dry deposition adversely impact human health primarily though inhalation of sulfur 
dioxide either in gaseous form, particulate form or a combination of both.  These compounds 
attack the respiratory defenses leading to respiratory diseases (Franklin, Burnett, Paolini, & 
Raizenne, 1985) and may ultimately lead to morbidity or mortality. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework of Permit Trading  
 
The goal of environmental public policy is for the protection of human health and 
ecosystems from harmful levels of pollutants.  In the development of public policies, selection of 
a policy instrument is paramount.  Policy instruments can be categorized into two broad areas: 
(1) “command-and-control” where policymakers typically specify a target reduction and/or 
technology for abatement and (2) market-based incentives, where policymakers design programs 
to change the behavior of the polluter.    
In developing environmental policy, regulators may claim a singular objective; whereas 
in reality a single regulation may try to maximize many objectives (Hahn & Stavins, 1992).  The 
criterion for selection of environmental policy instrument as described by Revez and Stavins 
(2004), and Perman et al. (2003) may include: 
1. Effectiveness – the policy achieves the stated target 
2. Cost-effectiveness – the target is achieved at the lowest possible cost 
9 
 
3. Information requirement – the policy provides government with information needed to 
implement the policy 
4. Flexibility – the policy is adaptable to changes as new information or technology arises 
5. Dynamic incentive – provides incentive for continual research and adoption of abatement 
technologies 
6. Equity – equitable distribution of the costs and benefits 
7. Political feasibility – the policy must be feasible to enact and implement 
For economists the policy selection criteria should be economic efficiency.  The concept 
of economic efficiency is grounded the concern of utilizing limited societal resources as to 
maximize utility.  In terms of policy, economic efficiency is achieved when net benefit is 
maximized; where net benefit is equal to the total cost minus total benefits of a proposed 
regulation (Olmstead, 2010).  Figure 2-3 below demonstrates a graphical representation of 
economic efficiency.  
In figure 2-3, the total cost curve increases at an increasing rate.  Initial abatement will target 
pollutants that are the most obvious and easier to remove.  As pollution reduction standards 
become tighter, finer particles are required to be removed.  As a result, the cost of compliance 
will also increase because firms will be required to adopt costly abatement equipment.  Benefits 
on the other hand are continually increasing, however at a decreasing rate.  The removal of finer 
particles of pollution may still have adverse effect on a sensitive portion of the population; this 
however is a small part of the population.  Economic efficiency as determined by maximization 
of net benefit will be larges positive difference between the total benefit and cost.  A criterion for 
economic efficiency is cost-effectiveness.  This is the main criteria discussed.  Revesz and 
10 
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Stavins (2004) expanded the cost-effectiveness definition to include criterion 1 to 5 referred to 
earlier.   
Historically, environmental regulations have been dominated by “command-and-control” 
type policy instruments.  Typically these regulations define technology based standard, 
performance based standards and set equivalent shares of control responsibilities among all 
affected sources (Tietenberg, 2006), (Hahn & Stavins, 1992) (Revesz & Stavins, 2004).  Started 
in the 1970s the federal government began instituting regulations such as the Clean Air Act and 
the Clean Water Act in response to public concerns of increasing levels of pollution in the 
environment.  The command-and-control instruments used have led to better air and water 
quality, removal of hazardous substances and protection of biological diversity (Kraft & Vig, 
2010).   
These instruments have achieved the targeted pollutant reduction, contributed to 
economic growth through the creation a new economic sector for pollution control and spurred 
innovation (Press & Mazmanian, 2010).  According to Taylor et al. (2005) command and control 
instruments have led to an increase in technological innovation such as flue gas desulfurization 
technology, which was in response to the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1970’s New Source 
Performance Standard provision.   
Though command-and-control techniques have worked, it has been increasingly 
criticized because these instruments (1) provide little flexibility for the affected sources to 
comply as these rules typically dictate a uniform reduction standard or specify control 
equipment; (2) lacks the ability to provide of dynamic incentives for continual removal of 
pollutant and technological innovation.  As Cook (1988) states, “the incentive under command 
12 
 
and control is simply to conform.”  Though, Taylor’s (2005) study found the instrument spurred 
technological innovation, the demand for scrubbers from electricity generating utilities remained 
low.  Finally, command and control (3) have been demonstrated not to be cost-effective, where 
pollution reduction was not achieved at the least cost. 
Economists have argued for the use of market based or incentive based policies.   Policy 
instruments that fall under the umbrella of market-based incentives include: emissions charges 
and taxes, subsidies, liability payments, and tradable emission permits (Perman, Ma, McGilvray, 
& Common, 2003).  This differs from command-and-control where the regulators impose 
mandatory restrictions or control obligations on the firm.  
Market-based instruments change the behavior of the firm through the creation of 
opportunity costs for each unit of pollutant that is emitted.  In an unregulated environment, there 
are no associated costs incurred to a firm for the emission of pollutants. The behavioral change is 
achieved when the external cost in the firms’ production function has been accounted for, thus 
internalizing externalities.  These instruments provide greater flexibility as regulators do not 
dictate to firms how the target should be achieved.  With the option to freely choose its method 
of compliance, profit maximizing firms have the incentive to achieve the target reduction at the 
least cost (Hahn & Stavins, 1992).   
Market based instruments and in particular, tradable emission permits are of interest.  
Environmental resources are by nature public goods, without regulations the affected source has 
little incentive to reduce its emissions voluntarily.  Under a tradable emission permit system, the 
regulator sets the emission reduction target.  A firm, as a profit-maximizer, would rationally 
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choose the least cost option required to meet the target.  In a conceptual model, cost-
effectiveness can be achieved when the following cost-minimization equation is satisfied: 
Equation 1 
   
  
   ∑  (  )
 
   
 
provided that: 
∑[     ]    ̅
 
   
 
and 
        
Where: C = aggregate cost of control 
  (  ) = cost function for source i 
   = reductions in emissions by source i 
   = uncontrolled emissions by source i 
 ̅ = aggregate emissions target imposed by regulator 
Source: Revesz & Stavins, (2004), (Tietenberg, 2006).   
 
From the above equation, cost minimization (and thus cost effectiveness) is achieved when the 
marginal abatement cost has been equalized across all firms (Revesz & Stavins, 2004) 
(Tietenberg, 2006) (Perman, et al., 2003).   
Conversely, for cost-effectiveness to be achieved under a “command-and-control” 
instrument, emissions levels would have to vary by individual firms according to their unique 
14 
 
marginal abatement cost function.  Given the state of asymmetric information, regulators 
generally do not have the appropriate information which would allow them to vary the cost-
effective control responsibilities among firms.  Additionally, moving from a previously 
unregulated environment to a regulated one, firms have the incentive to inflate their marginal 
abatement costs (Tietenberg, 2006) as it would mean lower emission control responsibilities.  
Thus, policies utilizing command-and-control techniques would fail to achieve the target 
reduction. 
Under a tradable emission permit system, the requisite marginal abatement cost 
information for the regulator is no longer required.  The regulator sets the total permissible level 
of emissions and the control responsibility is shifted to the individual firms.  The control 
responsibility is then determined by each individual firm’s marginal abatement cost function, and 
through the use of market pricing of emission permits, an efficient allocation will be determined 
within the industry. 
The tradable emission permit system is commonly referred to as a “cap-and-trade” 
system.   The “cap” represents the total permissible level of emissions.  The cap is reflected in 
the number of emission permits that is allocated by the regulator.  A permit is the right to emit a 
unit of pollutant as specified by the regulator (Montgomery, 1972).  “Trade” refers to the ability 
for firms to transfer the right to emit (a predetermined unit of) pollutant.  Under a system of 
tradable emission permits, the regulator sets the level of emissions that is permissible for a given 
geographic region to be achieved in a time period, where the permissible level is lower that the 
unrestricted level of emission.   
15 
 
The regulator is additionally required to design monitoring and enforcement systems to 
ensure compliance (Tietenberg, 2006).  The total permissible level, a system of monitoring and 
enforcement create the incentive to engender the desired behavioral effect, namely less polluting 
activities.   
 Prior to any regulation, cost-minimizing firms have the incentive to freely discharge 
waste into the environment.  In a system of tradable emission permits, each unit of pollutant 
discharged into the environment has an associated cost, which is the cost of the emission permits.  
As Moren (2009) described, Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990 created de facto 
property rights.  Thus where permits can be used either to cover emission by a firm or sold.  
Thus, the decision for a firm to pollute involves opportunity costs thereby creating the incentive 
to reduce its emission levels. 
Firms across an industry will have varying levels of marginal abatement cost.  These 
costs are dependent upon the age of equipment, production design, physical configuration, and 
level of technology (Revesz & Stavins, 2004).  Thus the valuation of permits will also differ 
among firms (Tietenberg, 2006).  A firm with a high marginal abatement cost will be willing to 
pay higher prices for additional permits, whereas, firms with low marginal abatement cost will be 
willing to pay less. 
Figure 2-4 demonstrates a stylized model of the marginal abatement cost structure of two 
firms.   In this model, Firm A has a higher marginal abatement cost (MAC) as represented by 
steeper curve.  Firm B on the other hand has a lower MAC depicted by a flatter curve.  For a 
given price X, Firm B can achieve larger emission reduction that Firm A.  Due to the difference  
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Figure 2-4: Marginal Abatement Cost for Two Firms 
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Source: Perman, et al. (2003) 
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between the two firms’ MAC curves, Firm B may find it cost-effective to pursue additional 
reduction and sell excess permits to Firm A.   
Building upon figure 2-4, figure 2-5 shows the efficient allocation of emission control 
responsibilities for two firms.  In this stylized model, the total unrestricted level of emissions is 
20 units, where both Firms A and B have maximum emission of 10 units each.  The horizontal 
axis shows the level of emissions for both firm A and B.  Note in this model any combination of 
control responsibilities would yield the regulatory pre-determined 10 units of emission. 
As in figure 2-4, the marginal abatement cost is higher for Firm A than for Firm B.  As 
graphically demonstrated in figure 2-5, the efficient allocation of control responsibilities for the 
two firms is the equilibrium point.  At the point where the MAC curves intersects the marginal 
cost of abatement is equalized between the two firms.  This is represented at the point where the 
MAC for Firm A intersects with the MAC for Firm B.   
If both firms were required to reduce their emission by 50%, it would require both firms 
to reduce 5 units from the unrestricted level.  Firm A with a higher MAC would incur higher cost 
than firm B.  Cost-effectiveness can be achieved by the ability to trade the right to emit.  Firm B 
with a lower with a lower marginal abatement cost can take on additional emission reductions 
while being compensated by Firm A.  The efficient allocation of control responsibilities would 
require Firm A to reduce it emissions approximately by 3.5 units and Firm B 6.5 units.  The total 
gain from trade is represented by the shaded blue area. 
An important feature built into a cap and trade system is that a prerequisite for cost-
effectiveness is (2) the flexibility firms have to determine its strategies of compliance and (2) the 
market determine control responsibilities.  Since the regulator merely sets the reduction target
18 
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Figure 2-5: Efficient Allocation of Control Responsibility 
 
Source: adaptation from Tietenberg (2000) 
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(the total permissible level of emissions is represented by the number of permits distributed to 
the affected source), firms can then choose their own method of compliance.  Firms have perfect 
information about their marginal abatement costs, thus as profit-maximizers, firms would  (1) 
rationally choose the least cost abatement method and (2) exploit gains from trade thereby 
creating a dynamic incentive for continual abatement activities. 
 As discussed earlier, a tradable emission permit system establishes permits which are the 
right to emit a unit of pollutant into the environment.  Thus, the regulator is required to design 
systems to monitor the emission of pollutants and enforcement procedures for non-compliance.  
This is a requirement for the cost-effective criteria (Tietenberg, 2006).     
 
2.2 Regulatory History of Sulfur Dioxide 
 
 The Clean Air Act was designed to “protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air 
resource so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its 
population.”  Since 1955 the act through subsequent amendments has been ever evolving.  An 
understanding of its history can provide some basis for analysis air regulations.  
Among the most significant amendments of the Clean Air Act is the 1970 Amendment.  
The 1970 amendment implemented the basic framework that exists today (Ferrey, 2010).  It 
established national standards for air pollutant and a list of six criteria pollutants to be regulated 
by the Environmental Protection Agency.  Criteria pollutants are naturally occurring atmospheric 
gasses; however, these gasses in high concentrations can lead to causes adverse effects on human 
health and the environment.   
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Sulfur dioxide (SO2) has been among the list of atmospheric pollutants regulated since 
the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1970.  According to the EPA, SO2 emissions 
lead to the formation of sulfuric acid and particulate matter.  This can lead to an array of adverse 
human health effects including respiratory and cardiovascular diseases and damage to the natural 
and built environment.  Consistent with the objectives articulated in the Clean Air Act, namely 
for the protection of human health and welfare, the EPA determined standards referred to as the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for the six criteria pollutants.  The standards 
are scientifically determined level to protect human health with an adequate margin of safety. 
The criteria pollutants include ozone, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, nitrogen 
oxide, sulfur oxide and lead.  It should be noted that the original criteria pollutant included 
hydrocarbons and excluded lead.  Hydrocarbons are regulated as a precursor to ground level 
ozone (Ferrey, 2010).  Lead was added to the list of criteria pollutant following NDRC v. Train 
(1975).  These NAAQS levels set by the EPA and are the minimum permissible level determined 
to protect human health with an adequate margin of safety.   
The Clean Air Act established a partnership between the federal government and the 
individual states in order to achieve these air quality standards (Ferrey, 2010).  The responsibility 
for the attainment and maintenance of the nationally uniform standards lies primarily with the 
individual states (CSR Report for Congress, 2007).  The act requires that the individual state 
outline its procedures that would bring its jurisdiction into attainment in a State Implementation 
Plan (SIP).  SIPs have to be reviewed and approved by the EPA; however the individual states do 
retain broad discretion as to the strategies that can employ in order to bring their region into 
compliance (Moren, 2009).   
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Initially, to comply with the NAAQS SO2 standards, coal fired electricity generating 
facilities built tall smokestacks, many of 500 feet in height (Burtraw & Szambelan, 2009).  As a 
result emissions were dispersed higher up in the atmosphere.  Emitted SO2 travel hundreds of 
miles and react with sunlight and water in the atmosphere to form sulfate which can then be 
deposited as dry particulate matter or wet when combined with rain, snow or fog.    
 Installation of tall smokestacks allowed local entities to meet NAAQS criteria.  However, 
since emissions are dispersed higher up in the atmosphere, states continued to experience 
difficulty in achieving attainment status on a regional level.  The failure of states to meet the 
NAAQS deadlines prompted Congress to impose new control measures.   
The Clean Air Act Amendment of 1977 introduced tighter standards for New Source 
where newly built plants were required to invest in the “Best Available Control Technology” and 
existing sources to invest in “Reasonable Available Control Technology.”  The statue expanded 
the New Source Performance Standard (NSPS) definition of “new” source to include (1) 
facilities with construction that began after the New Source Performance Standards were 
reviewed and (2) modification that were made to existing sources after the revision of NSPS 
(Brownell, 2009).   
These measures were put into place to achieve attainment status and for the prevention of 
significant deterioration (PSD) of “healthy air” (Ferrey, 2010).  The 1977 amendment also 
introduced the concept of “attainment” and “non-attainment.”  An “attainment” designation is for 
areas in compliance with NAAQS standards, and “non-attainment” is the designation for areas 
out of compliance. 
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 The designation of “attainment” status continued to be problematic for states to achieve.  
The Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990 instituted revised controls regulations for SO2 and NOx.  
In 1990 the legislative body broke from its traditional command-and-control methods such as 
technology specifications, and implemented the first market based approach to pollution 
abatement.  This approach is outlined in Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990. 
 Title IV created the first large scale cap and trade program as a means for pollution 
control.  The program referred to as the Acid Rain Program, controlled sulfur dioxide and nitrous 
oxide emissions.  The statute outlined emission reduction from electricity generating sources as 
the main contributor of SO2 and NOx.  The statute here also departs from its predecessors in that 
it, not only concerned with public health, but rather the larger environment.  According to 
Section 410 the “presence of acidic compounds and their precursors in the atmosphere and in 
deposition from the atmosphere represents a threat to natural resources, ecosystems, materials, 
visibility, and public health” Clean Air Act §401 (1990). 
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CHAPTER 3:  THE ACID RAIN PROGRAM 
3.1  Overview of the Acid Rain Program 
The discussion in the preceding section provided a basic framework of the economic 
merits of tradable emission permit system, which is the ability to demonstrate efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness.  The theory however, is described in a highly stylized manner with 
assumption of the absence of market failures.  These merits, however, can only be realized based 
on its implementation, which hinges upon the political process.   
The Acid Rain Program created under Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990 
established the first large scale system of tradable emission permits.  The program was 
conducted in two phases.  Phase I began in 1995 and included the largest emitters of SO2; this 
totaled 110 facilities and about 445 units.  These units were coal burning facilities primarily 
located in the Eastern and Midwestern parts of the U.S.  The allocation of SO2 permits for Phase 
I totaled 5.7 million.  Phase II began in 2000, the total allocated permits totaled 9.5 million and 
included all utilities with a 25 megawatts capacity or greater.  Starting in 2010 the EPA instituted 
a permanent cap of 8.5 million permits (EPA, Acid Rain Program, 2011).   
The allocations of permits to existing sources are distributed in two ways (1) 
grandfathering and (2) through an auction.  Existing facilities were grandfathered into the 
program based on their historic fuel consumption (thereby heat input) and emissions rate (EPA, 
2011).  Allowances are also distributed through a public auctions conducted by the EPA on a 
annual basis, usually held in March.   
The EPA withholds approximately 2.8% of the yearly allocated permits.  The auction is 
revenue neutral in that the EPA returns the proceeds from the auction to the source where it was 
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initially deducted.  The rationale of the auction is to provide price signals to the industry for 
future trading.  It should be noted here from 1993 to 2006 Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) was 
designated by the EPA to administer the auction (EPA, 2012), for which they received no 
compensation. 
EPA auctions are open to any registered parties, this includes regulated facilities, 
individuals, or organizations who wish to participate in the auction (which historically has 
included Environmental NGOs, University environmental clubs, and brokerage firms).  To 
participate in the auction, the party is required to submit a bid price and the quantity.  The 
Chicago Board of Trade (now the EPA) rank the bid prices from highest to the lowest and 
auction off the allowances until the supply is exhausted.  Holders are also permitted to sell 
unused permits at auctions.  EPA requires the holder specify a minimum price.  The agency 
returns any proceeds from the auction if sold or the permits if unsold.   
The program does not allocate allowances to new sources built after 1990.  These sources 
must obtain allowances either through the auction or buy them from other sources.  Sources built 
after 1990 are subject to new source performance standards which require technologies that 
would control sulfur dioxide emission.   
 The program allows for greater flexibility for the affected source to comply Title IV 
regulations.  As the EPA touts on its website, the program  
“represents a dramatic departure from traditional command and control regulatory 
methods that establishes specific, inflexible emissions limitation with which all affected 
sources must comply.  Instead the Acid Rain Program introduces an allowance trading 
system that harnesses the incentives of the free market to reduce pollution” (EPA, Acid 
Rain Program, 2011).   
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Compliance strategies employed by many sources include fuel switching, fuel blending, 
retrofitting facilities for co-firing and installation of scrubbers (Burtraw, 1996).    
 Permits have monetary value, thus monitoring and reporting is of importance for a well-
functioning market based incentive instrument.  The affected source is required by federal law to 
have continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS) installed and the information must be 
reported in order to ensure compliance.  CEMS are required to be in continuous operation and 
collect data at least every 15 minutes.  The EPA describes CEMS data to be “the gold standard to 
back up the paper currency of emissions allowances” thus accurate monitoring and reporting 
“instills confidence in allowance transactions…by certifying the commodity being traded” (EPA, 
2009).    
As it relates to compliance, the affected source is required to surrender allowances to 
cover its yearly emissions.  The EPA grants a 60 day “grace” period where a source may buy or 
sell allowances.  Sources out of compliance after the 60 day grace period face a penalty of an 
inflation adjusted $2000.00 per ton of SO2 emitted in excess of permits surrendered.  In addition, 
the affected source is required to offset its emissions.  This is done by having it deducted from its 
yearly allocation or bought on the open market.   
Unused permits can be banked (for future use), traded to other electricity generating 
units, sold to third party (usually a brokerage firm), or sold back to the EPA (EPA, 2009). The 
Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002 strengthened the enforcement provision.   The act strengthened 
federal criminal law regarding issues of compliance and document retention (Brownell, 2009). 
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3.2  Results 
3.2.1 Effectiveness  
 
 Title IV was effective in that the regulation was able to reduce the intended pollutant—
sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxides.  In 2009 the industry had emitted 5.7 million tons of SO2, a 
64% reduction compared to 1990 levels and significantly below the 9.5 million tons per year cap.  
(EPA, 2010).  Figure 3-1 below created from data obtained by the EPA demonstrates the decline 
of SO2 emissions from 1985 to 2010.  As a result sulfate concentration demonstrated in figure 3-
2 also declined across the contiguous United States.  On the left shows sulfate concentrations in 
1985 and on the right shows sulfate concentration in 2009.     
 
Figure 3-1: Yearly Sulfur Dioxide and Nitrous Oxide Emission (in tons) 
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Source: EPA Figure 3-2: Acid Deposition across the U.S. from 1985 - 2008 
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As a result of the emissions reduced by the program, the 2005 National Acid 
Precipitation Assessment Program (2005) report to Congress cited “measurable improvements” 
in surface water chemistry, sulfate concentration and acidity.  Recovery in freshwater lakes and 
streams have been increasing, where 8% of lakes in the Adirondacks are now considered 
acidified down from 13%; 5.5% acidified lake in the New England down from 5.6% (an 
insignificant decrease); less than 1% of acidified lakes in the upper mid-west down from 3%.   
The report qualified its finding by stating ecological recovery is a lengthy process and is 
driven by the hydrological and biogeochemical processes.  In some areas recovery may lag 
behind several decades.  Given these limitations, there are is insufficient scientific studies to 
demonstrate biological recovery of fish in the affected areas, and the recovery of forests.  
(NAPAP, 2005). 
An unintended consequence of the program is the reduction of mercury by 20% 
(Chestnut & Mills, 2005).  Mercury is an environmental pollutant that is harmful to both human 
and ecosystem integrity.  It has been the subject to regulation by the EPA as a hazardous air 
pollutant.  In 2005 the EPA announced the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) to reduce 
emissions.  The rule however was challenged in New Jersey v. EPA (2008) in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals D.C. Circuit.  The court vacated the rule and remanded it back to the EPA for revisions. 
 
 3.2.2 Cost-Effective 
 
 The program was relatively cost-effective, here cost-effective is defined as achieving the 
target reduction at the lowest possible cost.  The projected cost for Phase I compliance has been 
estimated to range between $678 million and $1,511 million (measured in $2000).  The actual 
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compliance cost has been now been estimated to be $814 million.  Projections for Phase II 
compliance have been estimated to be around $7.5 billion per year.  The actual compliance cost 
is estimated to be between $1.1 and $1.8 billion per year, significantly lower than projected 
(NAPAP, 2005). 
 Lower than expected compliance cost was achieved as a result of the flexibility granted to 
the utilities to choose their method of compliance.  Strategies employed include, fuel blending, 
fuel switching, installation of flue gas desulfurization equipment (scrubbers) and trading of 
permits.  The literature demonstrates the program could have achieved greater cost saving if it 
was completely free to choose its method of compliance.  Though on the federal level, the 
program allowed this freedom, state public utility commissions have restricted the options in 
some states.   
 Fuel blending and fuel switching have been the most favored approaches to comply with 
Title IV.  Utilities switched from high-sulfur coal to low sulfur coal or used a combination of 
both high and low sulfur coal.  Initial estimates of the cost of compliance were based upon the 
premise that utilities are designed to use a specific type of coal or a narrow range of coal 
properties (Shih & Frey, 1995).  Utilities however found it cost-effective to retrofit plants with 
the capacity to utilize different types of coal, a cost that has also been overestimated (Chestnut & 
Mills, 2005).  Without retrofit, utilities could blend up to 40% of low sulfur coal with high sulfur 
coal (Bohi & Burtraw, 1997). 
 The industry benefited additional cost reduction due to exogenous factor, particularly the 
decline in the cost of coal transportation as a result of the Stagger Act of 1980.  Low sulfur coal 
(subbituminous coal) has an average range of 0.5 lb to 1.2 lb of SO2 per mmBtu.  It also has the 
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lowest mine-mouth price (Ellerman, Schmalensse, Bailey, Joskow, & Montero, 2000).  However, 
subbituminous coal is primarily mined in the Powder River Basin located in the northeastern part 
of Wyoming; geographically located the furthest away from the primary coal markets.  Though it 
had the lowest price, the cost of transportation accounted for a substantial amount of the final 
cost.   
The Stagger Act of 1980 deregulated the railroad industry.  This ended the monopoly 
Burlington Northern Railroad company had out of the Powder River Basin (Ellerman, et al., 
2000).  As competition in the railroad industry increased, the cost of transportation decreased.  
The cost of rail transportation in 1979 was 2.0 mills
1
 per mile-ton.  By 1993 the cost had fallen to 
1.0 mill per mile-ton (USDOE, as stated in Ellerman et al. 2000).  The reduction in price thus 
made blending or switching with or to low sulfur coals a viable cost-effective compliance 
strategy. 
The cost of installing and operating scrubber technology also declined as result of Title 
IV.  The decline was not only due to the increased competition among the scrubber vendors, but 
rather from low-sulfur coal as well (Bohi & Burtraw, 1997).  Additionally, scrubber technology 
became more reliable.  Prior to 1990 new sources were required to install scrubbers with 90% 
efficiency.  However there was the lack of incentive for research and development to reduce cost 
and improve efficiency.  The Acid Rain program created such an incentive as utilities can sell 
unused permits (Popp, 2003). 
3.2.3 Correcting for Market Failures 
 
                                                          
1
 1 mill is the equivalent to one tenth of a cent 
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Critical to a well-functioning market based program is the absence of market failure.  
Such market failures include the lack of information and absence of property rights.  Several 
features of the program which attempts to eliminate the information criterion, this include: (1) 
EPA auctions and the (2) Clean Air Market Database.  As discussed above, the EPA withholds 
2.8% of year allocated permits for auction.  These auctions were designed to provide price 
signals to the industry that promote trade.  The importance of promoting trade other than an 
efficient allocation of control responsibilities is the development of “thick” markets which leads 
to lower transaction costs.   
The lack of or asymmetric information is another source of market failure.  The Clean Air 
Market – Data and Map database (now replaced by the Air Market Program Data) maintained by 
the EPA provides information on:  
 Emissions from the national level down to the unit level 
 Allowance, transaction history 
 Compliance  
 facility attributes 
 and general market trends 
The economic theory posits a well-functioning market will lead to the efficient allocation 
of goods and services.  This implies the costs and benefits accrue only the parties involved in the 
transaction, thus no externalities (Perman, et al., 2003).  Another criterion for the efficient 
allocation of resources is the absence of market failures, for example, the absence of private 
property rights. Environmental resources are by nature public goods, where property rights are 
non-existent or ill defined.  One such (environmental) resource is the atmosphere.   
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Rights are “particular actions that are authorized” by generally agreed upon enforceable 
prescriptions that require or permit specific actions for the individual (Schlager & Ostrom, 
1992).  Exploitation of environmental resources stem from the lack of property rights, where 
individuals have the incentive to use environmental resource because the benefits accrue to the 
individual, but not the cost (directly).  The lack of property rights for environmental resources 
could be a result from a variety of reasons which include: economic, technological, ecological 
and cultural (Cole, 2010).   
Title IV corrects for this market failure through the creation of permits.   Expressed in the 
Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990, an “allowances” or permit is the “right” to emit 1 ton of 
sulfur dioxide (SO2) into the atmosphere.  To this end, environmental protection is achieved by 
the administratively set quota on emissions and by the rules (laid out the CAAA of 1990) that 
govern its enforcement.   
3.2.4 Dynamic Effects 
 
Market based incentive programs in addition to being efficient and cost-effective, will 
spur innovation in related sectors (Requate, 2005).  Title IV has induced innovations particularly 
in scrubber technology.  Technological progress for scrubber has increased 8% a year (Kumar & 
Managi, 2010).   
The program has led to the growth of secondary markets for emission permits.  
Secondary markets have been developed where brokers act as intermediaries between buyers and 
seller and determine a market price for permits.  As a result, transactions cost declined and more 
accurate information of market price emerged as brokers publish the bid and sale prices to their 
clients (Joskow, Schmalensee, & Bailey, 1998). 
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The economic theory, legal structure and design and implementation of the Acid Rain 
Program demonstrated the predicted efficiency and cost-effectiveness.  There still remains the 
issue of explaining the dramatic decrease in the price of emission permits.  The following section 
describes the factors influencing the permit prices and the model designed to determine the 
effects of regulatory uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODS 
4.1 Data 
 
Due to the Acid Rain Program’s success it has served as a model for other cap-and-trade 
programs such as those created under the Kyoto Protocol and the European Union for carbon 
dioxide.  The program will continue to serve as a model for the future, thus analysis of the 
program is useful as a means to improve future models and guide their implementation.  In a 
market based incentive system, changes in the market, whether real or perceived, may have a 
profound impact on the program’s functionality.  In this case, regulatory uncertainty is 
hypothesized to be the reason of the decrease in permit prices. 
 To analyze the impact of regulatory uncertainty on permits prices, a multiple regression 
model based on economic theory of price behavior was used.  In theory the price of emission 
permits is a function of supply factors and demand factors.  In the case of emission permits the 
factors are summarized as follows: 
A. Supply factors: 
1. Initial allocation of permits 
2. Permits banked from prior periods 
 
B. Demand factors: 
1. Price of fossil fuel input i.e. coal, petroleum, and natural gas 
2. Cost of operating scrubbers 
3. Electricity generation from fossil fuels 
4. Price of Electricity 
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5. Hydroelectric generation 
6. Economic growth 
7. State regulations and restriction with respect to trading 
8. Periods of regulatory uncertainty 
(Boutabba, Beaumais, & Lardic, 2011) (Bohi & Burtraw, 1992) (Shih & Frey, 1995) (Lile & 
Burtraw, 1998) (Kumar & Managi, 2010) (Schennace, 2000) (Heutel, 2011) (Burtraw, 1996) 
(Hahn & Stavins, 1992) (Perman, Ma, McGilvray, & Common, 2003) (Revesz & Stavins, 2004) 
(Tietenberg, 2006) (Jaskow, Schmalensee, & Bailey, 1998) (Arimura, 2002) (Bohi & Burtraw, 
1997) (Sotkiewicz & Holt, 2005).   
Supply Factors  
The supply of permits as discussed in the preceding chapter is relatively stable as there is 
a fixed allocation from year to year.  Changes in the supply however are based upon the 
stringency of the cap.  Such changes occurred during the transition from Phase I to Phase II and 
then again starting in 2010.  The total allocation of permits during Phase I was 5.7 million, Phase 
II the aggregate allocation increased to 9.5 million and starting in 2010 a permanent cap of 8.9 
million was instituted.  The price of permits is a function of the supply, thus a reduction in the 
supply will lead to an increase in the price of permits, all other factors held constant. 
Permits banked from previous years provide an additional source of liquidity to the 
market.  In theory, an increase in banked permits will lead to a decrease in the price of permits.  
Conversely a decrease in the amount of permit banked would reduce the supply and lead to an 
increase in price of permits.  According to Schennach (1998) and Napolitano, et al. (2007), 
banked permits smooth out volatility in the price of permits.  Built up reserved provide utilities 
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with additional insurance for compliance against increased demand for electricity, shocks in the 
input fuel prices, or regulatory changes.   
 
Figure 4-1: SO2 Permit Prices and Permits Banked 
 
Figure 4-1above demonstrates that relationship between the permit prices and the number 
of permits banked.  Over time, the industry was able to reduce its emissions thus banking 
increased.  Consequently, as the supply of permits banked increased, the price firms are willing 
to pay will decline.   
Demand Factors 
 The demand for permits is a function of the input fuel (Boutabba, Beaumais, & Lardic, 
2011).  The three main types of fossil fuel are used in electricity generation are coal, petroleum 
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and natural gas.  Of the three groups, coal is associated with the highest level of sulfur content.  
The three most used coal types are Bituminous, Subbituminous and lignite.  Coal is also the 
cheapest on a per ton and mmBtu basis.    
Petroleum has the second lowest sulfur content associated with its combustion.  Finally, 
natural gas has no associated sulfur emission with its combustion.  Thus, as the price of high 
sulfur coal increases relative to other fuel groups the price for permits is expected to decrease as 
this would induce profit maximizing firms to switch to cheaper fuel.  If the price of low sulfur 
coal increases relative to the price of other fuel groups, the price of permits is expected to 
increase depending upon the fuel the firm uses as a substitute.  The use of high sulfur coal would 
lead to an increase in the price of permit whereas other fuel groups such as natural gas would 
lead to a decrease in the price of permits. 
Increase in the price of natural gas on the other hand relative to the other fuel groups, the 
price of permits is expected to increase.  Because natural gas has no sulfur emission associated 
with its combustion, an increase in the price would induce switching to other fuel groups which 
are associated with sulfur emissions, thus increasing the demand for permits thereby leading to 
an increase in the price of permits.  
 The operation of flue gas desulfurization (scrubber) equipment reduces emission of sulfur 
dioxide in the atmosphere from the combustion of fossil fuel.  In the absence of government 
regulations that mandate the implementation of such control technology, firm will choose to 
operate scrubbers if the price of permits is higher than its cost of operations.  Thus as the cost of 
operating scrubbers increase, it is expected that the price of permits would also increase. 
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 Electricity generated from hydroelectric sources has no associated sulfur dioxide 
emissions.  It is a substitute for electricity generated from fossil fuel.  As the generation from 
hydrological sources increase, electricity generated from conventional means is expected to 
decrease.  Thus, the price of SO2 permit is expected to decrease as emissions from sulfur will 
also decrease with an increase in electricity output. 
 Economic growth is expected to have a positive effect on the price of emission permits.  
As economies expand the demand for electricity is expected to increase.  The increased pressure 
for electricity output is expected to increased level of sulfur dioxide emission, thereby higher 
prices for emission permits.   
 State and the Public Utility commission’s regulations play a large role in determining the 
price of permits.  In accordance with the Clean Air Act, states are required to develop State 
Implementation Plans (SIP) detailing strategies that will enable their jurisdiction into compliance 
with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards that is set by the EPA.  Thus, consistent with 
the SIP, states and the public utility commission may mandate how electric generating units 
comply with Title IV.  As a result, states that have high-sulfur coal deposits such as Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia are pro-capital investment.  These 
states encourage the use of scrubber technologies.  This is in an effort to protect local economic 
growth.   
On the other hand states like Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire and 
Washington have state mandated environmental standards which utilities must meet.  New York 
regulations prohibit the sale of allowances based on environmental concerns (Lile & Burtraw, 
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1998).  Restrictions placed by the state laws and PUC influence the price of emission permits 
based on the goal(s) the state governments try to maximize.   
 Finally, regulatory uncertainty would play a role in determining the price of permits.  In a 
market setting, prices are affected based on changes that are either real or perceived.  As 
discussed in the conceptual economic framework section in chapter 2, a market based incentive 
gains efficiency from change in the regulatory framework, typically one that restricts polluting 
behavior.  Under these conditions, the price of permits is expected to increase if there is 
impending regulations that may further restrict emissions.  Prices are expected to decrease if the 
impending regulation relaxes the stringency. 
4.1.1 Variable Description 
The price of emission permit was obtained from the Bloomberg database.  The prices 
were reported in a daily format.  For this analysis daily close prices were averaged over a one 
month period.  All prices variable in the model were adjusted for inflation where the year 2000 
was used as the base year. 
The data for fossil fuel used in electricity generation was obtained from EIA-Form 423: 
Monthly Cost and Quality of Fuel for Electric Plants Data.  The form was terminated in 2007 and 
fuel cost data was consolidated into EIA Form 923 Monthly Utility and Nonutility Fuel Receipts 
and Fuel Quality Data (schedule 2).  The cost of fuel is reported in terms of cents/mmBTU for 
each unit on a monthly basis. 
Banked permits data were obtained from the EPA’s Clean Air Market Data and Maps 
database.  The data are available in a yearly format.  In order to transform the data into a monthly 
format, SO2 emission data which is available in monthly format was used.  The variation in
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Table 4-1: Data Description 
Data Description Source 
PERMIT Price of emissions permits as determined by the market Bloomberg 
COAL The average price of all coal in cents/mmBTU EIA Form 923 and author’s calculations 
OIL The price of petroleum in cents/mmBTU EIA Form 923 and author’s calculations  
NGAS The price of natural gas in cents/mmBTU EIA Form 923 and author’s calculations 
BP The number of permits banked EPA and author’s calculations 
RLHS The relative price of low sulfur coal to high sulfur coal EIA and author’s calculations 
HYDRO Electricity from hydroelectric generation EIA 
SCBR Cost of scrubber in cents/kwh EIA Form 767 
EGEN Electricity generation from fossil fuel in million kwh EIA 
ELEC Average price of electricity EIA 
IPI Industrial Production Index Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
REG1 Dummy variable where 1=periods of regulatory uncertainty 
following the announcement of more stringent PM 2.5 standards 
 
REG2 Dummy variable where 1=periods of regulatory uncertainty from 
when CAIR was argued in court to when the new rule was announced 
 
JAN  Dummy variable where 1=January and 0=otherwise  
FEB Dummy variable where 1=February and 0=otherwise  
MAR Dummy variable where 1=March and 0=otherwise  
APR Dummy variable where 1=April and 0=otherwise  
MAY Dummy variable where 1=May and 0=otherwise  
JUN Dummy variable where 1=June and 0=otherwise  
JUL Dummy variable where 1=July and 0=otherwise  
AUG Dummy variable where 1=August and 0=otherwise  
SEP Dummy variable where 1=September and 0=otherwise  
OCT Dummy variable where 1=October and 0=otherwise  
NOV Dummy variable where 1=November and 0=otherwise  
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emission was calculated then using the same rates banked permits were transformed into a 
monthly format
2
.  Scrubber costs were obtained from EIA Form 767.  The data is reported in a 
yearly format.  The monthly scrubber costs were calculated based on the monthly variation of 
electricity generation
3
.   
Regulatory uncertainty is represented using dummy variables.  Using information of the 
Acid Rain Program timeline, “1” is used to represent periods where there is potential for 
uncertainty as to the regulation governing the acid rain program.  This model contains two 
periods of regulatory uncertainty.  The first period (REG1) represents more stringent standards 
for particulate matter of size 2.5 microns.  The second period (REG2) reflects the period when 
CAIR was challenged.   
As discussed the emissions of sulfur dioxide not only contribute to acid rain, but it also 
contributes to the formation of sulfuric particulate matter.  March 29, 2007 the EPA announced 
more stringent standards for PM2.5.  April 13, 2007 the EPA administrator Stephen Johnson 
meet with the Canadian minister of Environment John Baird to announce the plans to reduce the 
flow of pollutants between the two nations.  On the markets for emission permits the prices 
sharply increase when faced with the prospects of more stringent standards.  Dummy variable 
was used to represent the period of unusually high prices.   
The second period of regulatory uncertainty is to represent the period when CAIR was 
challenged in court through its overruling; this runs up to the end of the data set.  Regulatory 
actions included are (1) when CAIR was argues, (2) D.C. Circuit’s initial ruling, (3) EPA’s 
petition for a stay on the rule and (4) D.C. Circuit grant a temporary stay with remand.   
                                                          
2
 There are slight discrepancies in the calculated monthly data.  This is due rounding error.    
3
 There are slight discrepancies in the calculated monthly data.  This is due rounding error.    
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Table 4-2: Summary of the Expected Signs 
Data Expected Signs 
COAL - 
OIL - 
NGAS + 
BP - 
RLHS -/+ 
HYDRO - 
SCBR + 
EGEN + 
ELECT - 
IPI + 
REG1 + 
REG2 - 
JAN  +/- 
FEB +/- 
MAR +/- 
APR +/- 
MAY + 
JUN + 
JUL + 
AUG + 
SEP +/- 
OCT +/- 
NOV +/- 
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The data ranges from May 2006 through December 2010.  The rationales behind the start 
date are (1) with time individuals and firms behavior will follow economic theory.  Since Title 
IV was the first cap and trade program implemented, it can reasonable assumed that electric 
generating utilities will be uncertain about the price of permits and their method of compliance.  
Thus behavior may not follow rational behavior.  (2) Period of uncertainty occurred in 2005.  In 
March the EPA announced the Clean Air Interstate Rule which would require further reduction 
in SO2 and NOx emissions.  Faced with the prospects of more stringent regulations, this can lead 
to higher permit prices.   
 
Figure 4-2: Price of Permits and the Volume Traded 
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In August and September 2005 hurricanes Katrina and Rita, respectively made landfall 
along the Gulf coast disrupting the supply of natural gas.  As a compliance strategy, many 
utilities switched from coal to natural gas in an effort to comply with the acid rain program.  The 
disruption in natural gas supply lead to an increase in the price of permits upward of $1600/ton 
of SO2.   Prices increased as firms switched back to coal with has SO2 emissions associated with 
its combustion.  The figure 4-2 below obtained from the EPA reflects the price of permits 
starting during Phase II of the acid rain program.   
It is unclear from the literature whether either one of these events or a combination is 
responsible for the rise in prices or the associated impact of each (Boutabba, Beaumais, & 
Lardic, 2011) (EPA, 2009) (Burtraw & Szambelan, 2009).  Regardless, the rise in prices are due 
to uncertainty be it regulatory uncertainty or otherwise; in this case uncertainty as to the supply 
of fuel input.   
Consistent with the objectives of this study which is to determine the effects of regulatory 
uncertainty, that entire period was eliminated.  By the start of 2006 natural gas service had been 
restored and the volatility in the price of permits had decreased.  The time frame used for this 
analysis captured both periods of certainty and regulatory uncertainty while other factors which 
determine the price of permits were relatively stable.  Table 4-3 provides the descriptive statistics 
for the variables used in the model. 
.  
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Table 4-3: Descriptive Statistics 
 PERMIT COAL OIL GAS BP RLHS SCBR EGEN 
 Mean  129.8624  228.4686  1486.119  640.1897  455403.3  0.589104  0.152608  242085.7 
 Median  97.04294  251.8072  1462.800  620.5420  417298.2  0.580912  0.150410  236853.6 
 Maximum  294.1284  287.1732  2268.596  1093.706  859819.5  0.667776  0.194581  319791.5 
 Minimum  3.888986  176.5797  1033.670  425.7594  115191.6  0.515190  0.119703  190658.1 
         
 Observations  56  56  56  56  56  56  56  56 
 
 ELEC HYDRO IPI REG1 REG2 
 Mean  9.151519  21783.17  93.64880  0.160714  0.589286 
 Median  8.830058  21412.61  94.48130  0.000000  1.000000 
 Maximum  11.36655  30818.44  100.7241  1.000000  1.000000 
 Minimum  7.607593  14742.53  83.52610  0.000000  0.000000 
      
 Observations  56  56  56  56  56 
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4.2 The Econometric Model 
 Following the economic model, the econometric model developed is as follows: 
 
      ̂                             (  )               
                                              
                                                 
                             
A linear multiple regression model was used to determine the effects of the each of the variables 
on the price of SO2 permit.  Consistent with economic theory the price of permits is a function of 
the fuel input, supply of permits, the availability of substitutes, cost of using control technology 
and regulations.  
 The analysis was conducted using EViews version 6.  Banked Permits was included as a 
lagging variable.  This is because permits banked in the current period    will be available for 
use in the following period.  All results were adjusted for heteroskedasticity-constant standard 
errors and covariance.   
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Results 
 
Table 5-1 report the regression results for the significant variables.  The significant 
variables are coal, banked permits, electricity generated from hydrological sources, regulatory 
uncertainty from the period when CAIR was challenged, and the months of May and June.  For 
each of the significant variables, the signs of the coefficients are as expected.   
The coefficient for coal is calculated to be -1.180184.  A one cent increase in the price of 
coal (measured in mmBTU) is estimated to decrease the price of SO2 permits by approximately 
$1.18.  The decrease in the price of permits is a result fuel switching and blending—a strategy 
used to comply with SO2 regulations.  As the price of coal increase utilities have the incentive to 
switch to other fuel source to generate electricity.  In addition to the price increase, the costs 
associated with using coal include operating scrubber technology or require additional permits 
for SO2 emissions.  
The coefficient for banked permits is calculated to be -0.00016, thus each additional 
permit banked, the price is expected to decrease by $0.00016.  Since banked permits provide 
additional liquidity to the markets, as the supply of permits increase the price is expected to 
decrease.  
Hydroelectric generation has no associated sulfur dioxide emission and is a substitute for 
electricity produced from fossil fuel, thus increase in electricity produced hydroelectric sources 
is expected to have a downward pressure on the price of permits.  The coefficient is reported to 
be -0.003374, where a one thousand megawatt-hour increase in the electricity produced to 
hydroelectric sources is expected to decrease the price of permits by $0.0033.   
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Table 5-1: Results of Significant Variables 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Coefficient 
C 1223.019 
(507.3171)** 
 
Coal -1.1802 
(0.6669)* 
 
Banked Permits -0.00016 
(3.98E-5)*** 
 
Hydroelectric Generation -0.0034 
(0.0018)* 
 
Regulatory Uncertainty— 
CAIR overturned 
-58.8088 
(25.8871)** 
 
May 43.8600 
(15.8378)*** 
 
June 30.2946 
(14.5507)** 
 
R-squared 0.9805 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9659 
F-statistic 67.6207 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.8244 
The Standard Errors are reported in the 
parenthesis.  *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% 
level, respectively. 
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The months of May and June are both expected to increase the price of permits.  The 
upward pressure on permit price is expected due to increasing demand for electricity during the 
summer months.  The month of May is expected to increase the price of permit by approximately 
$43.86.  The month of June is expected to increase the price of permits by approximately $30.30. 
The second period of regulatory uncertainty modeled is expected to decrease the price of 
permits by approximately $58.80.  In this model regulatory uncertainty was represented by 
dummy variables when CAIR SIPs and FIPs were due and when the case was argued and 
decided by the 9
th 
Circuit court.  In this context the dummy variables captured periods when 
regulations are expected to become more stringent, thus the price of permits are expected to 
increase.  However, after the case was vacated by the courts and the EPA was remanded to 
develop a new rule in its place the regulatory void created lead to a decrease in the price of 
permits because it is expected the rule will no longer be valid.  Additionally, at the time when the 
rule was vacated the industry has already banked a considerable amount of permits, allowing 
greater flexibility for future compliance.  
An assumption of the multiple regression model are normally distributed errors.  Figure 
5-1 demonstrates the histogram of normality.  The Jarque-Bera statistic tests the assumption of 
normality based on kurtosis (peakness) and skewness.  Kurtosis is expected to be 3 and skewness 
is expected to be 0.  Eviews calculates the both these values, and test if the test values are 
significantly different from each other.  The null hypothesis for the test assumes normally 
distributed errors (Hill, et al. 2010).  The Jarque-Bera is reported to be 0.2195 and with p-value 
of 0.8960.  Thus based on the Jarque-Bera test statistic, there is insufficient evidence to reject the 
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null hypothesis. 
 
Figure 5-1: Histogram of Normality 
 
5.2 Discussion 
 
Based on the regression results, the period of regulatory uncertainty when the regulation 
was challenged is expected to decrease the price of permits by approximately $58.80.  This is a 
modest magnitude with maximum prices at $129 and minimum at $3.88.  Also notable is the 
effects of banked permits which also have a very small effect of the price of permits.  From the 
earlier discussion, banked permits were expected to have a large effect on the price since it is an 
additional source of supply to the industry.  Thus during periods of regulatory uncertainty the 
valuation of banked permits should increase.  Given the low market prices for SO2 emission 
permits combined with the small effect of regulatory uncertainty and banked permits, it is 
apparent the industry’s demand for SO2 emission permits has declined.  
0
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Series: Residuals
Sample 2006M06 2010M12
Observations 55
Mean      -3.06e-14
Median  -0.650468
Maximum  29.64784
Minimum -39.39889
Std. Dev.   14.04360
Skewness  -0.149125
Kurtosis   3.082767
Jarque-Bera  0.219549
Probability  0.896036
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A possible reason for the declined demand for permits is the adoption of technology by 
the industry.  Installation of control technologies (i.e. scrubbers) would reduce the demand for 
permits since the industry can comply with the regulatory reductions.  This is reflected in the 
declining price for emission permits and a significant increase in the number of permits banked.  
Table 5-2 below obtained from the EPA show the number of scrubbers installed by year.  With a 
lead time of approximately two years for scrubber installation (EPA, 2002) the data shows a 
dramatic increase in the number of newly installed scrubbers in operations starting in 2007.   
Table 5-2: Scrubber Installation 
Year Scrubbers (total) Newly Installed 
2000 246 1 
2001 260 8 
2002 274 6 
2003 311 2 
2004 321 0 
2005 324 7 
2006 335 9 
2007 363 32 
2008 421 46 
2009 467 39 
2010 511 29 
 
 A one-way analysis of variance determined a statistically significant difference between 
the period before and after the Clean Air Interstate rule was announced.  Table 5-3 reports the 
ANOVA results.  Based on the F and P-values there is a statistical difference between the two 
periods.   
 The results imply the industry has made plans to comply with the Clean Air Interstate 
Rule when the rule was promulgated in March of 2005.  The historical trend of compliance with 
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Table 5-3: ANOVA of Scrubber Installation 
ANOVA 
     Source of 
Variation SS df MS F P-value 
Between Groups 53254.87 1 53254.87 24.58692 0.000782 
Within Groups 19493.86 9 2165.984 
  
      Total 72748.73 10       
 
the Acid Rain Program showed compliance was achieved mostly by the installation of scrubbers 
because of a more stringent cap on SO2 emissions.  Phase II compliance was dominated by fuel 
blending and fuel switching.  According to Tietenberg (2006) “emissions trading will promote 
cheaper approaches.  When non-technology approaches (such as fuel switching) turned out to be 
chapter, it is they, and not the new technology, that will be chosen.”  The greater stringency of 
the cap attributed to CAIR have led the industry toward the adoption of scrubber technology. 
 Five days after the final version of CAIR was announced, the EPA on March 15, 2005 
announced the Clean Air Mercury Rule which was designed to reduce mercury emissions.  
Though a 2000 EPA study concluded it “appropriate or necessary to regulate” coal and 
petroleum electricity generating utilities, these sources were delisted from the final rule.  In 
response to the delisting, 14 states (listed in table 5-5) implemented regulations to control 
mercury emission from utilities. 
 New Jersey v. EPA (2008) challenged the EPA’s decision of delisting coal and 
petroleum utilities from the Clean Air Mercury Rule, in the U.S. Court of Appeals D.C. Circuit.  
The court ruled: 
“the delisting was unlawful.  Section 112 requires EPA to regulate emissions of HPAs. 
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Table 5-4: States with Mercury Emission Regulations and Year Enacted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Year Enacted 
New Hampshire 2002 
Connecticut 2003 
New Jersey 2004 
Delaware 2006 
Maryland 2006 
Illinois 2006 
North Carolina 2006 
Montana 2006 
Minnesota 2006 
Massachusetts 2007 
New York 2007 
Colorado 2007 
Georgia 2007 
Wisconsin 2008 
South Carolina 2008 
Michigan 2009 
Oregon 2010 
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Section 112(n) requires EPA to regulate EUGs under section 112 when it concludes that 
doing so is ‘appropriate and necessary.’” 
As a result the Clean Air Mercury Rule was remanded to the EPA for revision in a manner that is 
consistent with the court’s decisions 
Additional support for the installation of scrubber technology is the ability to remove 
mercury in addition to sulfur dioxide.  Scrubbers have to ability to remove oxidized mercury 
with an efficiency rate of 80% - 90% which translates to approximately 70% - 78% of total 
mercury.  (Srivastava, Hutson, Princiotta, & Staudt, 2006) (Senior, Helble, & Sarofim, 2000).   
 Though CAIR was vacated by the D.C. Circuit in December of 2008, the courts placed a 
two year deadline for the EPA to develop a replacement rule.  Therefore there remained the 
expectation that the stringency of the replacement rule would comparable to the SO2 and NOx 
reduction mandated by CAIR.  Coupled with an additional regulation for mercury emissions, 
compliance would require the use of control equipment.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
The use of market based instruments is effective when there is a framework that changes 
the regulatory environment in which firms and individuals operate.  In this case, in an 
unregulated environment, a profit maximizing firms have little incentive to reduce the level of 
pollutant emitted in the atmosphere.  Regulations such as Title IV of the CAAA of 1990 attached 
opportunity costs for each unit of pollutant emitted, thus changing the incentive structure of 
firms.  The incentives created by imposing opportunity cost combined with the ability to trade 
the rights to emit, enabled firms to cost-effectively achieve the target reduction. 
The subsequently loss of a regulatory constraint was expected to results in an increase in 
the level of pollutant emitted in environment due to the decline in the opportunity cost.  Such 
loss of the regulatory constraint occurred in 2008 when the U.S. Court of Appeals D.C. Circuit 
vacated the Clean Air Interstate Rule which required the industry to further reduce its emission.   
Regulatory uncertainty when analyzed in the context of Title IV exerted a significant 
relatively moderate effect of on the price of SO2 permits during the final days of CAIR.  Though 
the price volatility was above normal, during this period the market price for SO2 permits 
sharply declined.  The prices remained low even in the face of a temporarily reinstated the rule 
by the D.C. Circuit, and the expectation of a replacement rule.  Additionally, SO2 emissions 
continued the downward trend to levels that is beyond the Acid Rain Program cap of 8.9 million 
tons per year.   
It appears the industry has already made provisions to meet the regulatory mandated 
reductions when the final version of CAIR was announced in 2005. This is evident from the 
number of scrubbers installed reported by the EPA.  As shown in chapter 5, after allowing for an 
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approximate lead time of two years, the number of newly installed scrubbers dramatically 
increased starting in 2007.  As per the court’s decision, the rule was remanded back to the EPA 
to develop a new rule for CAIR’s replacement.  The rule did not pass judicial review because of 
the strategies it employed to enforce the standards, thus the expectation for the new rule is an 
equally stringent emission cap and changes to means by which states and the industry meet the 
requirements.   
Even in the face of uncertainty the program continued to demonstrate dynamic efficiency 
as illustrated by the lower emission.  In addition, the program also continued to demonstrate 
cost-effectiveness.  This is shown by the industry’s ability to deploy control technologies when 
needed to comply with regulatory requirements. 
The overruling of CAIR is a loss of a required condition for market based incentive 
programs to be effective.  The program however benefited from other regulations.  This included 
the rules under the Acid Rain Program, and state regulations.   
Future research should consider the rate of technology adoption that was demonstrated 
after 2007.  Further research into the effects of regulatory uncertainty would benefit to conduct 
investigation at the state level.   
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APPENDICIES 
Appendix A: List of Regulatory and Proposed Regulatory Actions 
Date Description 
Jan. 1995 Acid Rain Program Phase I begins 
Jan. 2000 Acid Rain Program Phase II begins 
Jan. 2004 The Clean Air Interstate Rule Proposed 
Mar. 2005 Clean Air Interstate Rule Announced – Final version 
Mar. 2005 Clean Air Mercury Rule Announced – Final version 
Mar. 2007 EPA finalized more stringent rules for Particulate Matter 2.5 
Apr. 2007 EPA administrator Steven Johnson met with the Canadian Ministry of 
Environment to reduce the transport of pollutants across the US-Canada 
border 
Mar. 2008 CAIR (North Carolina v. EPA) argued in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, DC. 
Circuit 
Jul. 2008 North Carolina v. EPA decided.  The D.C. Circuit vacated the rule and 
remanded it back to the EPA for revisions 
Sept. 2008 EPA petitioned the Court’s ruling on the grounds of protection of human 
health and environmental integrity 
Dec. 2008 D.C. Circuit grants a temporary stay and remand 
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Appendix B: ANOVA results for the justification of inclusion dummy variables 
One-way ANOVA analysis was performed to determine if there is any statistical difference in 
the price of SO2 permits as a result of regulatory actions.   
 
Tighter PM 2.5 Standards 
ANOVA        
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 73925.1 1 73925.1 90.85688 2.97E-16 3.922879 
Within Groups 94382.64 116 813.6434     
        
Total 168307.7 117         
 
CAIR Argued 
ANOVA        
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 56713.32 1 56713.32 169.2099 1.96E-21 3.960352 
Within Groups 26813.24 80 335.1655     
        
Total 83526.56 81         
 
D.C. Circuit July 2008 decision 
ANOVA        
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 109152.2 1 109152.2 267.4855 1.53E-27 3.957388 
Within Groups 33461.55 82 408.0677     
        
Total 142613.7 83         
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EPA Petition for a re-hearing  
ANOVA        
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 21472.01 1 21472.01 43.52061 3.83E-09 3.957388 
Within Groups 40456.81 82 493.3757     
        
Total 61928.82 83         
 
D.C. Circuit decision on the re-hearing 
ANOVA        
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 3084.49 1 3084.49 13.04982 0.000542 3.96676 
Within Groups 17963.56 76 236.3627     
        
Total 21048.05 77         
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